Forensic audit reveals how Ghana’s Embassy in the U.S. extorted $19.3 million from visa and passport applicants

For six years, thousands of visa and passport applicants who turned to Ghana’s Embassy in Washington believed they were following standard government processes and paying the right fees.

They filled out forms online, paid the service fees and paid extra money to have their documents mailed back to them.

In many cases, that was where the official process ended.

Some applicants never received their passports. Others waited for months. Unknown to applicants, a different system, which redirected them and imposed additional charges, had been embedded. That new system generated nearly $19.4 million in what the Auditor-General has now classified as irregular proceeds.

The findings follow an earlier escalation of the situation that led to the temporary closure of Ghana’s Embassy in Washington in 2025 after U.S. authorities and Ghanaian officials were alerted to irregularities in its operations. Reports indicated that concerns about delays, missing documents, and unclear fee structures at the mission prompted the investigations by Ghana’s Auditor General.

A forensic audit by the Auditor General has revealed that consular services such as visa issuance and passport processing are ordinarily administered through official government systems, including the Electronic Consular Information Management System (eCIMS) and AppTrack. These platforms are designed to manage applications, record transactions, and ensure that all statutory fees are collected through approved channels.

Under Ghana’s Public Financial Management framework and Foreign Service Regulations, all such fees must be transparent, approved, and properly accounted for.

However, the audit found that this structure was altered through website manipulation, external platforms, and additional charges embedded into the application process. Applicants who accessed the embassy’s official website were redirected to privately controlled platforms where they were required to pay $29.75 per application for the return of their passports or visas.

The audit established that the expected or actual cost of postage averaged $10.10, meaning each applicant paid nearly $20 above the cost of service.

 “These arrangements enabled the collection of dispatch/mailing fees and application support service charges from applicants,” the report states.

The largest component of the $19.3 million illicit fees charged came from these mailing and dispatch charges.

"The forensic analysis of visa and passport processing activities at the Embassy of Ghana in Washington, D.C., identified irregular financial transactions related to dispatch/mailing charges between 2019 and 2025; application support services between 2021 and 2025; extra merchant fees for online payments between 2020 and 2025; as well as transactions involving Fred Kwarteng & STEFRANN LLC between 2019 and 2020," the report said.

The audit report notes that the embassy discontinued the use of self-addressed return envelopes in 2023, removing any alternative method for applicants to pay for the return delivery of their documents from their end. As a result, every applicant was required to pay the fixed mailing fee regardless of the actual cost incurred.

Data drawn from the embassy’s own systems showed that more than 170,000 visa mailing transactions and thousands of passport dispatches were processed during the period under review.

The audit calculates that applicants paid a total of US$6,945,554.00 in mailing and dispatch fees. After deducting the estimated actual postage cost of US$2,357,986.40, it was found that the excess generated from mailing fees alone amounted to US$4,587,567.60.

In addition to mailing charges, applicants were required to pay application support service fees through the unapproved external platforms to which they were redirected. These fees were set at $67 for passport applications and $76.78 for visa applications. The audit indicates that these services were presented as necessary for completing applications, even though they were not part of officially approved government charges.

The report also identifies irregularities in payment processing arrangements. It notes that additional merchant fees were imposed through the use of the Square payment platform, despite the absence of a formal contract governing its use. These fees further increased the cost to applicants and contributed to the overall financial exposure.

These charges formed a system in which applicants paid more than the official cost of consular services. Using records from eCIMS and AppTrack, the audit calculated total transactions of $21,337,446.70 linked to these activities. After accounting for actual costs of approximately $2,357,986.40, the remaining $19.37 million was classified as irregular.

The audit also documents operational failures that occurred alongside these charges. Although applicants had already paid for mailing services, the embassy accumulated a backlog of 12,721 visa and passport applications between June and August 2025.

During that period, the embassy managed to mail only 4,507 applications, while 8,214 applications were either collected through personal pickup or remained undelivered, contributing to delays, complaints and additional administrative burden.

 “This situation suggests that the dispatch fees previously collected from applicants were not utilised for their intended purpose, exposing the Embassy to avoidable financial loss,” the report states.

To address the situation, the embassy incurred an additional cost of about $45,000 to post letters and clear part of the accumulated backlog. This expenditure occurred even though applicants had already paid for mailing services through the system.

According to the audit report, Fred Kwarteng, an Information Technology Officer at the embassy, created and operated external platforms, including TravelGhana.Net and GhanaPV.org, along with associated entities such as Ghana Travel Consult, Secure Data Centre LLC, Travel Global, and MFG Technology.

A table from the Audit report detailing the illicit amounts made from the various infractions committed by the Ghana Embassy.

These platforms were linked to official embassy systems and, in some cases, replicate them. Applicants were redirected to these platforms from the embassy’s official website and required to make payments through them when they were not approved platforms.

The audit notes that these platforms used official symbols and presentation styles that gave the impression of government authorisation.

 “The website redirected applicants from the Embassy’s website to pay fees for postage and application support services. Applicants were charged $29.75 for return postage and additional support service fees through the platform,” the report states.

The report also identifies senior officials whose roles coincided with the operation of the system. Joseph Ngminebayihi, who served as Minister (Consular) from 2017 to 2021, oversaw consular operations during the early stages of third-party involvement. His successor, Amidu Mohammed Karande, served from 2021 to 2025 during the continued use of external platforms within official workflows.

The audit further states that Alima Mahama, who served as Ghana’s Ambassador to the United States from 2021 to 2024, approved a contract formalising the outsourcing of dispatch services to entities linked to the system.

"Her Excellency Alima Mahama served as Ambassador and Head of Mission from 2021 to 2024. As Ambassador and Head of Mission, H.E. Alima Mahama exercised ultimate supervisory and financial authority over the Embassy’s operations. She signed the General Contract for Services between the Embassy and Travel Ghana / Secure Data Center, thereby formalizing the outsourcing of passport and visa dispatch functions to a related party, with unauthorized fees charged to applicants. During her tenure, the Mission faced scrutiny over banking compliance, exposure to related-party transactions, and weaknesses in governance controls," the report said

The report concludes that the irregularities were enabled by weak internal controls and inadequate oversight, allowing unauthorised platforms and staff-linked entities to operate within official systems.

 “The redirects were implemented directly within the website’s source code, showing administrative-level access,” the report states.

“These arrangements allowed staff-linked entities to handle passport dispatch, visa processing communications, and payment arrangements without appropriate authorisation or oversight,” the audit states.

“These irregular charges were imposed through the manipulation of the Embassy’s official website, the creation of parallel digital platforms, and the compulsory redirection of applicants,” the report states.

The Auditor General recommended that these monies be retrieved from the officials involved in the crime and sanctioned accordingly.

“We recommend recovery of the amount from the Key Actors. Again, the affected officers should be sanctioned in accordance with the Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Act 1038),” the report added.